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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
R. M. SCOVILLE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 7824 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts have been fully set forth in appellant's and 
respondent's briefs, as well as being reviewed in the major-
ity and the dissenting opinions of this court. For this rea-
son the facts are not set forth again herein. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE CASE WAS THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ONLY, AND, THERE BEING NO DISPUTE, THE 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THE COURT VIEW 
THE EVIDENCE IN ANY MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT THAN 
HIS OWN TESTIMONY PROVIDES. 
POINT 2. 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF ASSENTED TO THE TERMS 
OF THE 1949 BONUS PLAN OR NOT IS IMMATERIAL, FOR 
IN EITHER INSTANCE RULES OF LAW APPLY. 
POINT 3. 
THE DEFENSES OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AND 
ACCOUNT STATED ARE RULES OF LAW FOR THE COURT 
TO APPLY AND NOT QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR A JURY 
TO DETERMINE. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AMENDED THE FACTS AD-
DUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
POINT 5. 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS A RULE OF EVIDENCE 
TO BE APPLIED BY THE COURT AND THE COURT IS BOUND 
BY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH EVIDENCE SUBJECT TO 
SUCH RULE WAS INTRODUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE CASE 
WAS THE PLAINTIFF'S ONLY, AND, THERE 
BEING NO DISPUTE, THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO HAVE THE COURT VIEW THE EVI-
DENCE IN ANY MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT THAN 
HIS OWN TESTIMONY PROVIDES. 
! i 
I ' 
The defendant respectfully submits that subsequent 1 1 
to the introduction of evidence by the plaintiff, and be-
fore any ·evidence had been introduced by the defendant, j I ! 
I 
4 
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the defendant moved the court for an i~voluntary dis-
missal under Rule 41 (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or a directed verdict. This was granted by the court. · 
The only evidence in this case is that of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff cannot have the benefit of the evidence most 
favorable to him to the exclusion of that evidence which 
he also introduced and which is inconsistent with any · 
otherwise favorable evidence. The testimony of a wit-
ness is no stronger than it is left by his further examination 
or his cross-examination. 
In Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 91 Utah 
405, 64 P. (2d) 351, (Utah 1937) this court quoted from , 
Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 P. 
594, 596: 
u c::. * * If there be a contradiction, it arises 
from the plaintiff's own testimony. In such a case, 
where a nonsuit is asked, the trial court may con.,. 
sider such testimony true as bears the most strongly · 
against the interest of the plaintiff.'" 
This court then quoted and reaffirmed the rule laid 
down as follows: 
uin Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 
Utah 187, 14 P. (2d) 973, 981, this court says: 
(( (In considering the testimony of the appli-
cant on the issue as to whose employ he was in, 
we must look, not alone to the answers made by 
him to leading questions, or on assumptions that 
he was in the employ of Putnam, but to the whole 
of the testimony bearing on the subject. As to 
that, the familiar rule is applicable that testimony 
of a witness on his direct examination is no stronger 
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than as modified or left by his further examination 
or by his cross-examination. A particular part of. 
his testimony may not be singled out to the ex-
clusion of other parts of equal importance bearing 
on the subject.' 
uln Corpus Juris the rule is again stated: 
u tT o determine whether the evidence makes 
an issue of fact, the whole of the evidence and not 
merely certain selected parts thereof is to be con-
sidered.' " 
If plaintiff introduced evidence, or agreed to its intro-
duction during cross-examination, or testified to certain 
facts and circumstances, he is bound by such evidence. 3 2 
C.].S., Sec. 1040, pp. 1104, 1111. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF ASSENTED TO 
THE TERMS OF THE 1949 BONUS PLAN OR NOT 
IS IMMATERIAL, FOR IN EITHER INSTANCE 
RULES OF LAW APPLY. 
There is no contradiction nor dispute of any kind 
upon which reasonable minds could differ as to the follow-
ing facts and circumstances which were proved by the 
plaintiff: 
1. The Bonus Plan for 1948 contained these limita-
tions: 
u* * * As we discussed in our meeting at Bat-
tle Creek, the Bonus Plan for 1948 will be as fol-
lows. * * * 
6 
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uof course this means that we will look at 
the situation at the end of 1948 and see if this is 
the best possible bonus arrangement, both from the 
standpoint of the individual salesman and the Kel-
logg Company :.~ '~ :.~" (Ex. rrA"). 
2. The 1949 Bonus Plan contained these limitations: 
((The Bonus Plan covered in Bulletin No. 
148-3, dated January 29, 1948, expired as of De-
cember 31, 1948. The Bonus Plan for 1949 which 
we feel is fair to all concerned is as follows: :f- * :f. 
((The above Bonus Plan covers 1949 operations 
only." (Ex. ffB") 
3. The plaintiff received both of the foregoing plans 
and in each instance continued to work for the defendant. 
He worked for the defendant for some 17 months after 
receiving the 1949 Bonus Plan. 
4. In January of 1950 plaintiff received a letter re-
ferring to the 1949 Bonus Plan. This letter also referred 
to a conversation which he had had about the 1949 plan: 
((Dear Ray: 
ttW e are discontinuing bonus plan which was 
in effect and we will not have a bonus plan for 1950. 
We are advancing your salary, effective January 1, 
1950 from $325.00 to $375.00 per month. This 
will confirm our recent conversation. * * *" (Ex. 
3) 
5. On January 30, 1950 the plaintiff received a 
check and a letter in payment for the 1949 bonus and in 
accordance with the 1949 Bonus Plan. The letter unmis-
takably contained an invitation to object, if such objec-
tion he had: 
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uPlease find enclosed our check in the amount 
of $3544.35 to cover bonus. for the year 1949. * * * 
uy t was necessary to go ahead and clean this 
matter up based on the figures we have, but subject 
to revision·, if the figures you are sending prove 
ours to be incorrect. We will appreciate having you 
forward Helen's figures (plaintiff's wife who kept 
his files,· books and records) as soon as possible so 
we can check this out, but we did have to close our 
books for 1949 and that is the reason for going 
ahead and making the calculation." (Ex. 6) 
6. Plaintiff returned the foregoing check because 
no withholding tax had been deducted, and on February 6, 
1950 a check in the amount of $2,981.92 was drawn by 
the Kellogg Sales Company in favor of the plaintiff. He 
received, endorsed and cashed the check. (R. 48, Ex. 4) 
7. Later, on April 24th, another check for the bal-
ance due on his 1949 bonus was drawn and transmitted 
to the plaintiff with the following specific information: 
( ( ::· ::· ::· Attached find check in the amount of 
$1,026.88 representing the balance due on your 
bonus for 1949." (Ex. 8) 
Plaintiff received, endorsed and cashed that check. 
The foregoing facts stand undisputed in the record, 
testified to by the plaintiff. 
This court states in its majority opinion that ((Scoville 
denies that he assented to the terms of the Bonus Plan for 
1949." The foregoing facts must be considered without 
the benefit of any favorable light in determining whether 
such assent existed or not. Any statements made or let-
8: 
.. 
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ters written upon which plaintiff relies as negativing an 
assent are as follows: 
1. November 4, 1948 at breakfast in Portland, Ore-
gon, plain tiff testifies that Mr. Borsum said: 
u* * * tThat is a lot of feed.' I said: tknow it, 
and it is going to mean a lot of hard work,' and 
I said: tWith the bonus :figured the way they are 
now, I am also going to make a lot of money, around 
$30,000.00.' . 
uHe said: he tdidn't see any reason why the 
bonus should be changed at that time, there was 
nothing that should be changed in the set up, for 
1949.'" (Italics ours) (R. 23, 24) 
2. On April 16, 1949 in plaintiff's hotel room in 
Omaha Mr. Scoville said: 
ul said: ty ou are also going to pay me a lot 
of bonus too.' He said: tWe have got money to pay 
the bonus, you sell the feed.' 
* ==· * 
ul said: tBill (apparently W. H. Williams), it 
will take a lot of feed and I will get a lot of bonus, 
it is pretty near time to shut off out there.' 
uHe said, tW e will take care of you, Kellogg 
has got plenty of money and we will make the 
feed."' (R. 25, 26) 
3. In July or August, 1949, at a sales meeting in 
Omaha, and, according to Mr. Scoville, just a ·few days 
before he received the 1949 Bonus Plan, he had the fol-
lowing conversation: 
uA. I asked Mr. Borsum if it was going to 
make any difference with my territory, as I was 
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told several times my territory operated different 
than anything back there. 
uHe said, cNo, we will work that out, what-
ever change is made I will let you know.' 
uAnd he said: ci don't think it will make a 
bit of change, Ray, in your set up.' " (R. 27) 
4. On July 24, 1949, according to Mr. Scoville's 
testimony, he had written a letter discussing the 1949 
Bonus Plan. This letter said in part: 
u,z. * * Also your letter of July 11, regarding 
the bonus plan, which of course is very important 
to me, I have read it very carefully, but I am not 
ready· to give you my thoughts on it, for my feed 
business is practically assured ... from the start. 
And from the wording of this letter I can see where 
it could be changed to where I would not get any 
bonus. * * * " (Ex. 10) 
He received the following response to his letter: 
u:>:. * * With further reference to the bonus 
plan for 1949, you are practically assured of one 
and a good one at that." (Ex. 11) 
At the trial Mr. Scoville testified, in response to a 
question as to whether after receiving the 1949 Bonus 
Plan he had entered a protest or talked with any of the 
officials of the company, as follows: 
((Not at the-I wrote them a letter at that 
time but there was nothing more said about it." 
(R. 28) 
5. By plaintiff's own testimony the only indication 
of a conversation about the 1949 plan after its receipt was 
on January 9, 1950, some five to six months after the 
10 
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1949 Bonus Plan must have been received. This conversa-
tion was at a turkey show in Minneapolis, Minnesota and 
Mr. Scoville testified to the following conversation: 
((Mr. Borsum told me I would have to follow 
the new schedule of the bonus which was issued 
in August, that he had sent out, and that he didn't 
think it was a good thing that I should make any 
trouble about it or say anything, or discuss it, be-
cause that is the way it was and that is the way it 
had to be. 
((That if anything was said, if I took it up with 
the higher ups both him and Mr. Williams and my-
self would all lose our jobs, and if I kept my mouth 
shut I could stay on indefinitely as long as I was 
doing the job." (R. 29) 
Thereafter the checks and letters heretofore described 
followed. Seventeen months after receiving the Bonus Plan, 
and nearly a year after receipt of the first check, comes 
the first protest, written to an official of the Kellogg Com-
pany. In that letter plaintiff refers to the Bonus Plan of 
1949 and acknowledges receipt of it. He avers that the 
conversations he had with Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams 
several times regarding how this would affect him, made 
the plan inapplicable to him. A material portion of that 
letter is as follows: 
u~. * ~· This bonus plan was not changed until 
July 1949, at which time my feed was practically 
all sold for 1949, and this letter was sent out by 
Mr. L. C. Borsum saying the company had changeq 
their minds regarding the 1948 bonus plan, and 
making this change retroactive to January 1st, 
1949. Now Mr. Roll, I had talked with both Mr. 
Williams and Mr. Borsum several times regarding 
11 
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how this would effect (sic) me, and each told me it 
made absolutely no difference as long as I sold the 
feed, but especially in April of 1949 did I discuss 
this with ~hem at a sales meeting in Omaha, and was 
assured again that it made no difference, that I 
would g~t the $2.00 per ton bonus on all feed I sold 
that year. 'And at th~t time I gave them ,approxi-
mately what. the figures for the year 1949 would 
be." (Ex. 1'2) 
A comparison of the conversations testified to by 
- the .Pl.aintiff with the cha_rges ~a~e in th~ letter leaves 
- no doubt in reasonable minds as to what was said. The 
plaintiff testified to the conversations and, apparently in 
their entirety, such statem~~ts as, c~He didn't see any 
reason why the bonus should be changed at that time, 
there was nothing that should be changed in the setup 
. for 1949," uwe have got the money to pay the bonus, you 
sell the feed," uwhatever change is made we will let you 
know," are phrases from plaintiff's testimony. Th~y testify 
to a change and the anticipation of one on the part of the 
plaintiff .. Certainly ~hey cannot be construed to mean any-
thing other than they say. In connection with this there 
can be no denial or misinterpretation of the phrase in the 
1948 Bonus Plan that uAs we discussed in our meetil)g at 
- Battle Creek the Bonus Plan for 1948 will be as follows:" 
. and uof c-;>urse this means that we will lao~ at the· situa-
tion at the ~nd of 194.8 ~"' * * ." 
rhe~e can be no question upon which r.easonable 
.minds cou~d differ as to the testi.J;ll~ny of the plaintiff. 
His knowledge of the 1948 and the 1949 pl~n, his accept-
~nce ~£ '~il the ~he~ks, ·.end~,_-sing and cashing them, and 
_ his · information that they were paid on the basis of the 
12 
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1949 plan, leaves nothing upon which any different con-
clusion could be based. 
Regarpless of the foregoing, the majority opinion in-
dicates that the question of whether plaintiff assented to 
the terms of the 1949 plan or not was fpr a jury to deter-
mine. We respectfully submit that whether plaintiff did 
or did not assent thereto is immaterial, for in either in-
stance a rule of law, not a question of £,act, becomes a ppli-
cable. If plaintiff did not assent to the 1949 plan prior 
to the acceptance of the checks and the statements, then 
a dispute existed, and the rule of law of accord and satis-
faction applies. If plaintiff accepted the Bonus Plan of 
1949 then he cannot subsequently repudiate it, and the 
rule of law of an ~ccount stated applies. 
The very recent case of W eis v. Duro Chrome Corp., 
207 F. (2d) 298 (C.C.A. 8th, October 14, 1953), will il-
lustrate the application of accord and satisfaction and is 
~rectly in point. In that case an employee brought an . 
action against his employer to recover the difference be-
~een the amount of commissions originally provided in 
his employment contract and the amount he received after 
a reduction of the commissions by the employer. In affirm-
ing a judgment adverse to the employee the court held: 
u::. * ::· In April, 1947, plaintiff and defendant 
entered into a written contract by the terms of 
which defendant employed plaintiff to solicit 
orders for the defendant's products in the terri-
tory therein described upon a commission basis 
under a schedule therein contained. The contract 
contained the following provision: 
u 'We (defendant) reserve the right to change 
commtsstons, discounts, or prices at any time we 
13 
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may deem necessary without giving prior notice-
regardless of existing catalogue, bulletin or circular 
prices (either net or list) as shown in any printed or 
typewritten literature which may be· in your pos-
session or in the hands of the trade.' The contract 
also contained a provision that it might be termin-
ated by either party on 30 days notice in writing. 
Plaintiff's commissions as provided by the written 
contract were 10%. On January 28, 1948, claim-
ing to act pursuant to the above quoted provision 
of the contract, defendant gave written notice to 
plaintiff of a reduction in his commissions from 1 O% 
to 8%, and on December 3, 1948, by written notice 
defendant advised plaintiff of a further reduction 
in his commissions to 7~ %. During all the times 
here involved defendant sent to plaintiff monthly 
statements showing a complete record of the busi-
ness written the previous month and the percentage 
upon which the commissions were based, and en-
closed a ·check for commissions as shown. These 
checks were cashed by the plain tiff and so far as 
appears from the record without protest for more 
than one year, the plaintiff stating in his testimony 
that he thought the difference between the com-
missions stated in the contract and the reduced rate 
was being accumulated until the defendant was 
operating at a profit. In the present action plaintiff 
seeks to recover the difference between the amount 
of commissions calculated at 10% as originally pro-
vided in the contract and the amount which he 
received under the reductions made by defendant. 
* * * 
u* ::- ::- In the course of performance of the 
contract subsequent to the action of defendant in 
reducing plaintiff's commissions, plaintiff received 
compensation evidenced by checks based upon the 
14 
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reduced schedule of commissions. These checks were 
received and cashed by him. In these circumstances 
he cannot now be heard to contend that they were 
not accepted by him in full payment. The state-
ments specifically indicated the amount due plain-
tiff and the checks received and accepted by him 
represent that amount. It is contended by plaintiff, 
however, that the acceptance and cashing of the 
checks by him did not estop him from seeking to 
recover what he now claims to be due him because 
the amount due was a liquidated amount. The 
trouble with this contention is that the amount 
claimed to be due was not liquidated. There was 
a denial by the defendant that any amount in ex-
cess of the amounts shown by the statements and 
checks submitted was due him. If there was any 
reasonable contention between the parties as to the 
correct amount due plaintiff the submission of these 
statements with the checks amounted to an accord 
and when accepted by the defendant the transac-
tion constituted an accord and satisfaction. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Rau Const. Co., supra; McGregor 
v. J. A. Ware Const. Co., 188 Mo. 611, 87 S. W. 
981; Zinke v. Knights of the Maccabees, 275 Mo. 
660, 205 S. W. 1; Whitmire v. Lawrence, etc., Mo. 
App., 286 S. W. 842; Ellis v. Mansfield, 215 Mo. 
App. 292, 256 S. W. 165." 
See California Bean Growers' Association v. Rindge Land 
& Navigation Co., 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R. 904, (Cal. 
1926); Benites v. Ha1npton, 3 Utah 369; Ashton v. Skeen, 
85 Utah 489, 39 P. (2d) 1073 (1935); Ralph A. Badger & 
Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n., 94 Uta!J 97, 75 P. 
(2d) 669 ( 19 3 8) ; Bro1vning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
of the United States, 94 Utah 532,72 P. (2d) 1060 (Utah, 
1937); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 90 Utah 405, 
15 
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64 P. (2J) 351 (Utah, 1937); Bell v. ].ones, 100 Utah 
87, 110 P. (2d) 327 (Utah 1941). See, also, the annota-
tions at 34 A.L.R. 1035, 1036, and 75 A.L.R. 905, both 
annotations being -referred to in State, et al. v. Campbell 
]3/dg. Co., et _al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. (2d) 341 (Utah 
1938). In the annotation of 34 A.L.R. at page 1036, the 
g~neral rule is given: 
uBy the great weight of authority the accept-
ance .and use of a remittance by check, purporting 
to be cin full,' or employing words of similar import, 
or accompanied by a letter to that effect, amount 
to an accord <and satisfaction of the larger claim 
of the creditor, assuming that the claim was un-
liquidated or di~puted, so that an express agreement 
to accept, and the actual acceptance of, the smaller 
amount in full satisfaction, would have been bind-
ing." 
As hereafter pointed out, the dissenting opinion sets 
out this rule of law and quotes it quite fully from Corbin 
on Contracts. 
Defendant is entitled to the benefit of any contro-
versies in the evidence produced by the cross-examination 
or in plaintiff's own evidence. The burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to establish his case. If plaintiff, in 
support of such burden, created a question of fact for 
a jury susceptible of two interpretations, we submit that 
he is not entitled to select the interpretation most favor-
able to him. 
· The majority opinion indicates that the question as 
to whether plaintiff's action constituted an acceptance or 
not was a question for the jury. It is apparent that re-
gardless of the determination of the jury as to that fact, 
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such determination would lead only to an application of 
a rule of law by the court that accord and satisfaction 
had been reached or that an account stated resulted. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENSES OF ACCORD AND SATISFAC-
TION AND ACCOUNT STATED ARE RULES OF 
LAW FOR THE COURT TO APPLY AND NOT 
QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR A JURY TO DETER-
MINE. 
The majority opinion states that whether plaintiff's 
actions constituted an accord and satisfaction, or whether 
his actions bound him to an account stated, are questions 
for the jury. 
We again point out that all the testimony in this case 
was adduced by the plaintiff. The weight of authority 
as to whether such defenses are rules of law when applied 
to uncontroverted facts adduced at trial, is in favor of 
such application as a rule of law. The majority opinion 
seems to indicate that the application of such rules, in-
cluding the rule of estoppel, is a question of law for the 
court, when it said: 
u.As to the estoppel claimed by the defendant, 
it is difficult to find in the record any representa-
tion knowingly made by plaintiff upon which he 
intended defendant to rely and which the defend-
ant, having done so, acted to its legal detriment." 
This would seem to preclude the application of the rule 
of law to the facts in the case as adduced by the plaintiff. 
Conversely, such language would indicate that the facts 
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support the application of the rule of law of accord and 
satisfaction and accounts stated. 
The dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority 
as to whether it was a jury question on accord and satis-
faction and quotes from Corbin On Contracts, Sec. 1279, 
Vol. 6, p. 9 7: 
uwhere the amount due is in dispute, and the 
debtor sends cash or check for less than the amount 
claimed, clearly expressing his intention that it 
is sent as a settlement in full, and not on account 
or in part payment, the retention and use of the 
money or the cashing of the check is almost al-
ways held to be an acceptance of the offer oper-
ating as full satisfaction, even though the creditor 
may assert or send word to the debtor that the sum 
is received only in part payment. The creditor's ac-
tion in such case is quite inconsistent with his words. 
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not in fact 
assent to the offer made by the debtor, so that there 
is no actual (meeting of the minds.' But this is 
merely another illustration of the fact that the 
making of a contract frequently does not require 
such an actual meeting. . . . It has seemed to the 
courts more beneficial to hold that the creditor's 
action speaks louder than his words and is operative 
as an acceptance of the offer as made. 
uThe cashing, or the certification, of a check 
expressly sent in full settlement of a disputed 
claim, operates as an accord and satisfaction if, a~ 
the time, no word of dissent is sent to the party 
offering it in satisfaction. 
uin these cases it is held that it makes no differ-
ence that the creditor did not know that the effect 
of his cashing the check or keeping the money 
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would be the discharge of his entire claim. This 
is supported by fundamental legal doctrine. The 
acceptance of an offer makes a contract even 
though the parties do not know the law or the 
legal consequences of their agreement." 
Other authorities agreeing with the dissenting opinion 
are numerous and appear to represent the great weight of 
authority. In 1 C.J.S., Sec. 49, pp. 567, 569, the rule of 
law is stated at page 5 67: 
uwhere there is substantially no dispute as to 
the facts on which a claim of accord and satisfac-
tion is based, the question of the creditor's assent 
is one of law to be determined by the court." 
At page 569 the following rule of law is giv~n: 
uThe court may direct a verdict for defendant 
where he has established accord and satisfaction by 
conclusive and undisputed evidence, or where the 
facts in evidence give rise to a conclusive presump-
tion of acceptance in satisfaction; but it may and 
should refuse to do so where accord and satisfaction 
has not been proved or where the question is one 
for determination by the jury, as where the evi-
dence is in conflict or the facts necessary to estab-
lish accord and satisfaction are in dispute." 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AMENDED THE 
FACTS ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
The majority opinion contains the following state-
ment in summarizing the testimony of the plaintiff: 
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u* :lZ. :l!· That he saw no reason why the bonus 
· should he changed at that time and that nothing 
would be changed in the 1949 setup." 
We respectfully submit that the use of the word uwould" 
is incorrect. Mt. Scoville, in his testimony, used the word 
ushould." The dissenting opinion discusses this change in 
the testimony. The word ushould" imparts the flavor of 
umight be" to the conversation. This flavor continues 
throughout subsequent conversations and attacks any in-
ference that the 1948 Bonus Plan uwould not" be changed. 
Conjecture and speculation arise to cloud any probability. 
POINT V. 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS A RULE OF 
EVIDENCE TO BE APPLIED BY THE COURT AND 
THE COURT IS BOUND BY THE PURPOSE FOR 
WHICH EVIDENCE SUBJECT TO SUCH RULE WAS 
INTRODUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
In passing on the question of the admissibility of 
statements made by the plaintiff and others prior to the 
issuance of the Bonus Plan for 1949 under the parol evi-
dence rule, the majority opinion designates the statements 
as relating to the question of acceptance or non-acceptance 
of the 1949 Bonus Plan. The majority opinion states: 
uDefendant urges that the trial court did no~ 
err in striking as inadmissible under the parol evi-
dence rule, all statements made prior to issuance of 
the cBonus Plan for 1949,' whether they had re-
sulted in agreement or not, since they were merged 
in the later agreement. Such contention assumes the 
most important fact in this case,-whether Scoville 
accepted the terms of the cBonus Pla1J. for 1949.' 
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The facts most favorable to plaintiff are not such 
as would require all reasonable minds to conclude 
that there was such an acceptance, hence whether 
Scoville's actions were such as to constitute an ac-
ceptance also was a jury question." 
The rule governing the inadmissibility of parol evi-
dence is directed not at an assumption nor the end result 
or interpretation of the proffered evidence. Whether 
Scoville accepted the 1949 Bonus Plan or not does not 
alter the admissibility of statements made prior to its 
issuance. The importance of applying the parol evidence 
rule lies in the court's statement that such contention as-
sumes the most important fact in this case,-whether 
Scoville accepted the terms of the Bonus Plan for 1949. 
It stands uncontradicted in the record that the purpose 
for which such evidence was introduced by the plaintiff 
was in an attempt to vary the 1949 Bonus Plan. We re-
spectfully submit that the trial court and this court was 
and is bound to accept the purpose and intent for which 
such evidence was introduced as specifically and undeniably 
offered by the plain tiff. 
uMR. CALLISTER: If the court please, it 
is no attempt to vary the written contract, it is an 
attempt to vary one not received until July or 
August, 1949. This conversation took place the 
latter part of 1948." (R. 23) 
We respectfully submit that it does not now lie in the 
province of this court to state that such evidence was 
offered to indicate lack of assent to the 1949 plan, when 
it was specifically announced by plaintiff in open court 
that its purpose was to vary the 1949 plan. 
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To hold that such parol evidence is admissible be-
cause to strike it might -eliminate the possibility that rea-
sonable minds would have to conclude that there was no 
acceptance, seems to overrule the parol evidence rule as 
such has been established and adopted by this court and 
applied many times. Certainly the admissibility of such 
evidence is a question for the trial court, not the jury, and 
should be separated from the effect such evidence, if ad-
mitted, might have on the acceptance or lack of acceptance 
on the part of the plaintiff. Not only was the evidence 
not introduced by the plaintiff for such purpose, but the 
question of acceptance or non-acceptance should properly 
be determined from the statements and actions of the 
plaintiff and others subsequent to the 1949 Bonus Plan 
after it was received and acknowledged by the plaintiff. 
The evidence is admissible or not admissible under the 
parol evidence rule, and whether its effect assumes the 
most important fact in the case does not alter its admis-
sibility under such rule. To hold otherwise seems to 
adulterate the purpose of the parol eviden.ce rule and 
overules it as it has been accepted and established in the 
courts of this state and every other jurisdiction of the 
country. 
In Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Ut. 380, 230 P. 1097 (Utah 
1925), this court said: 
celt may be said in passing, however, that the 
rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the 
terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in writ-
ing, is elementary in this and every other jurisdic-
tion of the country." 
22 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion considered the evidence in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff's theory of the case. This 
court should not have so viewed the evidence where the 
only evidence adduced was that of the plaintiff, and 
there being no dispute in the evidence defendant was en-
titled to the benefit of any discrepancies, contradictions 
or testimony supporting the defenses and objections raised 
at the trial. Plaintiff was bound by such testimony, un-
favorable though it may be. 
Plaintiff's undisputed evidence showed he anticipated 
and received the 1949 Bonus Plan, that he thereafter dis-
cussed it, received a statement of his bonus thereunder, 
together with checks therefor, which checks he endorsed 
and cashed without protest. He received the 1949 Bonus 
Plan some seventeen months before registering any com-
plaint and he had received statements and cashed checks 
without complaint until nearly a year had elapsed. The 
evidence he alone adduced established the defense of ac-
cord and satisfaction or account stated. 
Whether he assented to the 1949 Bonus Plan or not 
is immaterial, for if it could possibly be found from the 
evidence that he did not assent to the 1949 Bonus Plan 
then a dispute existed and accord and satisfaction applies 
precluding recovery. On the other hand, if it were found 
that he did not assent, then he· cannot be heard to repudiate 
the 1949 Bonus Plan and an account stated precludes his 
recovery. 
Accord and satisfaction and account stated are rules 
of law to be applied by the court and not questions of 
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fact for the jury where the facts are not in dispute. The 
facts cannot be in dispute in this case where such were 
adduced by plaintiff alone. 
The majority opinion substituted the word uwould" 
for the word ushould" and neither the inference such a 
word as uwould" might otherwise support nor the sub-
stance of the word itself is found in the record. 
The parol evidence rule should be applied to the evi-
dence introduced by the plaintiff where the specific pur-
pose for which such evidence was introduced was an-
nounced by the plaintiff in open court. Evidence of con-
versations had prior to and purporting to vary a written 
instrument is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, 
and this is so regardless of any possible indications of intent 
to accept such instrument which might be otherwise in-
ferred from the substance of such conversations. The 
majority opinion in effect overrules the parol evidence 
rule and the decisions heretofore given by this court ap-
proving the rule in this jurisdiction. 
We respectfully submit to this court that the dis-
senting opinion not only recognizes that the facts stand 
undisputed in the record as having been introduced by 
the plaintiff alone, but also correctly states the law appli-
cable to such facts. The petition for rehearing should be 
granted and the judgment of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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